Will there be war or peace at the end of the so-called transitional phase?
The prevailing feeling is that it depends on forces beyond Afghanistan’s citizens: Afghan power brokers, the insurgency, USA, Pakistan,
The prevailing feeling is that it depends on forces beyond Afghanistan’s citizens: Afghan power brokers, the insurgency, USA, Pakistan, Iran, India.
US-NATO military forces keep training Afghanistan Security Forces to fight the war they are leaving, regardless of the fact that there is not a real Afghanistan State to conduct it and that the narco-economy keeps booming, only benefiting a powerful drug mafia.
We all know –the warriors in first place- that one side winning militarily over the other will not finish the war. It is the time of politics. There is a dramatic lack of reliable leadership, though.
Altogether, the immediate future may look gloomy.
What could and should be the role of Afghanistan’s civil society, and how?
During the last twelve years tools to foster a civil society protagonist role have been developed; within it, the multiplication of non-governmental organisations and media.
There are today thousands of civil society organisations (CSOs) and hundreds of radios, TVs, newspapers, websites and the new phenomenon of social media. Its potential is enormous.
Own critical reflection
However, there needs to be a critical reflection of its own potential power and on how building power to turn such potential into a reality that shows leadership and has voice in the creation of a sustainable State at the service of the Afghan population.
In all cases, defining power-building policies and efficiently communicating contents that matter are at the heart of peace, democracy and wealth.
Media should not only channel the voice of the superstructure but that of the people and the CSOs, fulfilling its expected watchdog role and generating public debate and opinion making.
CSOs should communicate with its constituencies – those with whom they work and that should be the source of strength – with organisations in the same field of activity – with whom it should be building socio-political power- and the population at large.
The point of departure for a critical reflection needs the acknowledgement of a very relevant fact: the US-led NATO forces came into Afghanistan with a military scope and an agenda that needed to be voiced by media and implemented by NGOs.
There were no media at the beginning of 2002. In 2003 and 2004, the international community delivered millions of dollars to create media and train thousands of journalists to “international standards”, as it was defined instead of “professional standards” at the service of Afghans.
National media and local media could be launched: commercial, not-for profit, public, partisan media, too, while communities witnessed expatriates bringing them their “community radio”. When the war escalated, also ISAF created its network of radios hosted in fortified PRT compounds. Now PRTs are closed, while financial self-sufficiency is expected for the rest of the media in a country were the market economy grows slowly and there is no advertising culture. Many will collapse.
Later it happened as what happens in any war context, whether by design or not, two main “narratives”: the US-NATO’s and the insurgents’ ones. Then also the Afghan government narrative was added.
Young reporters and media that dared to cover the “narrative” of Afghanistan’s reality were and are killed or threatened. Actually, there is not yet a law ensuring free access to information on what the government decides despite the fact that the contracts signed have an impact on the entire population.
Beside the solid, still very strong NGOs created in the 1980s and 1990s, hundreds of new ones blossomed following the opportunities sown by the international community.
Many of them, really committed ones, have been building the powerful “narrative” of Afghanistan’s new reality.
Allies, not competitors
Others, mainly committed to fund-raising opportunities will probably disappear in the near future when many of NATO countries’ agendas would have been fulfilled; resources at its service are already shrinking.
The availability of funding generated a negative competition that should end immediately, putting fund-raising as a medium to implementing coordinated policies and not as the final objective.
On the positive side of this growing reality, independent media also took a step forward to cover Afghanistan’s “narrative” hand-in-hand with CSOs, considering its unique sources of information, news and opinion. In March 2012, The Killid Group, Pajhwok Afghan News, Hasht-e-Subh, Saba TV and Nawa Radio created the Independent Media Consortium (IMC), on the basis of a common editorial policy. IMC represents a unique outreach potential.
These media and CSOs are currently trying to build a potentially powerful synergy. It is still weak because it lacks a deeper and updated reflection on the role each one should play and on the relevance of communicating.
Meeting such social responsibility would also offer an answer to the leadership and hope that too many are claiming.
The 65 percent youth component in Afghanistan’s population must know that there are Afghans resolving conflicts peacefully, fighting corruption, demanding proper justice, monitoring development, requesting transparency and access to information, surveying the richness of the country, fighting for equal opportunities and the respect of human rights.
These millions of youngsters should also feel that there is a place for each one of them within a civil society sector that does want to be a big player and a voice that any forthcoming government will have to listen to.
